Abstract
Introduction
The growing body of research into the impact of political connections provides mixed evidence of their effect on the market value and performance of firms. Several studies find that political connections are valuable, as ties with the government help firms to gain comparative advantages, which enhance firm performance and value (Fan et al., 2008; Fisman, 2001; Goldman et al., 2009; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Li et al., 2008) . Such advantages include access to key resources, including bank loans granted at favorable terms (Charumilind et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008) , favorable tax treatment (Adhikari et al., 2006; Faccio, 2006) , a higher IPO offering price (Francis et al., 2009) , and government-sponsored bailouts . In addition, the favorable treatment enjoyed by firms with political connections is found to be more pronounced in countries with interventionist governments and weak protection of property rights (Faccio, 2006) .
In contrast, other studies find that political links have a negative effect on firm value and performance. Based on a sample of 42 countries, Faccio (2006) reports that politically connected firms underperform their non-connected peers on an ex ante basis, even though political ties provide a number of benefits. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) find that listed firms in China with politically connected CEOs underperform those without connected CEOs, while Yuan (2008) finds that strong CEO political connectedness reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Boubakri et al.(2008) report that firms with politically connected boards do not have managerial incentives to maximize shareholder wealth and improve overall firm performance after privatization. Faccio (2006) documents that the phenomenon of political connections is widespread, but the interpretation of empirical evidence across countries is difficult because of the different levels of institutional and economic development. In one country, China, political connectedness has been documented to have both positive effects (Berkman et al., 2009; Fan et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2009; Li et al., 2008) and negative effects Yuan, 2008) on firms. Hence, China provides an interesting institutional setting in which to examine the mixed evidence of political connections.
In this study, we attempt to reconcile the conflicting evidence by positing that the value of political connections depends on ownership structure, that is, whether the firm is state or privately owned. According to the resource-based theory of the firm, the value of political connections is mainly driven by ties with the government, which help firms to obtain key resources and thereby increase their value. Among privately owned firms that operate in weak institutional environments and which lack ties with the government, having a politically connected manager helps them to overcome market and institutional barriers and to seek favorable treatment from the government (Li et al., 2008) . However, government ownership represents a much more direct tie with the government than having a politically connected manager. Hence, the value of connected managers among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may be diluted by government ownership, and a firm's having a connected manager may not ensure that it will obtain favorable treatment from the government.
Based on agency theory, politically connected managers may be associated with a policy burden among SOEs. As the ultimate owner, the government has the power to intervene in the operations of SOEs, and has the incentive to do so in the form of pursuing political and social goals, such as reducing unemployment. The government usually appoints politically connected managers who will prioritize the alignment of firm goals with government objectives rather than the maximization of firm value. Politically connected managers in private firms generally play a role different from that of their counterparts in SOEs. In private firms, these managers help the firm to gain favorable treatment from the government, whereas in SOEs, they receive little help from the government but rather shoulder the burden of carrying out government policies. Thus, whereas having a politically connected manager increases firm value among private firms, it decreases firm value among SOEs.
Using the data of Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2006, we attempt to empirically verify whether the effect of a politically connected manager on firm value differs between private firms and SOEs. We find that private firms with politically connected managers have a higher value than those lacking such managers, whereas local SOEs (SOES with a local, rather than the central, government as the ultimate owner) with politically connected managers have a lower value and poorer performance than those without such managers.
We also examine the effect of politically connected managers on the subsidies that a firm receives from the government and the surplus labor that it absorbs. Our results show that private firms with politically connected managers obtain more government subsidies than those lacking such managers, whereas local SOEs with politically connected managers employ more surplus labor than those without such managers. We conduct additional tests to determine whether the chairman or CEO drives these effects, thereby extending the literature on CEO political connectedness to include chairmen. We find that neither politically connected chairmen nor connected CEOs drive the effect by themselves, which suggests that both are important in Chinese firms and that neither is more important than the other in determining firm value and performance. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it extends the research into political connectedness by demonstrating that the effect of political ties on firm value and performance is subject to ownership structure, which represents a step toward reconciling the mixed evidence on political connections. It also contributes to the literature on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance in transitional economies (e.g., Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007; Jandik and Rennie, 2008; Sun and Tong, 2003) .
Second, we identify the direct channel by which politically connected managers harm firm value. Previous research has traced the negative effects of politically connected CEOs to CEO incompetence and the insensitivity of CEO turnover to performance (Boubakri et al., 2008; Yuan, 2008) . We show that the burden of implementing government policy (proxied by surplus labor) is an alternative channel through which connected managers adversely influence firm value and performance.
Third, the present study augments the literature on top management in Chinese listed firms. Some researchers (e.g., Yuan, 2008) argue that the CEO best represents top management in China, whereas others (e.g., Firth et al., 2006; Liao et al., 2009) contend that the chairman does. Our finding that neither the chairman nor the CEO alone drives the effect of political connections on firm value and performance suggests that it is better to regard both as top management in Chinese listed companies, because both are important in the operations of these firms. In addition, as China has a two-tier board system similar to that of some European countries, including Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway and Finland (Kaplan, 1995; Maury, 2006) , our findings of the relative importance of the roles played by the chairman and CEO in firm performance have implications for these countries, as there is no clear evidence that Chairman or CEO is regarded as the top executive (Kaplan, 1995) .
Fourth, the impact of political connectedness on firm performance could be shaped by institutional factors, including the prevailing economic conditions, corporate governance practices, institutional and regulatory frameworks, and legal environment (e.g., investor protection, legal enforcement), and economic development. Faccio (2006) finds that the favorable treatment enjoyed by firms with political connections is more pronounced in countries with interventionist governments and weak protection of property rights. One little understood characteristic of the reform in China is the very uneven economic and legal development across the country. We believe that differences in regional development could have profound effects on the role of political connectedness across different types of ownership. We explicitly account for market development using an index that is designed to capture differences in institutional factors across regions. The advantage of interregional over cross-country studies is that the former can capture the effect of institutions on the role played by political connections without contamination due to omitted country factors.
Finally, this study offers cross-sectional implications for other countries. Similar to the case in China, firm ownership is highly concentrated and state control is important in some European countries (Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Klapper et al., 2006) . Political connectedness is also a common phenomenon among European firms (Faccio, 2006) . Therefore, the findings of this study have implications for European countries, as they indicate the differential impact of state versus private ownership on the value of political connections. Our paper also helps international investors that are investing in China's capital market 1 to understand which factors are determinants of firm performance in China.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional background and ownership and top management structure in Chinese listed firms. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and variables.
Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Institutional Background

SOEs and Private Firms in the Chinese Stock Market
The most important of the recent economic reforms in China has been the corporatization of SOEs, which were originally owned by the central and local governments. Corporatization has allowed SOEs to sell shares to the public (known as 
Classification of Chinese Listed Firms by Ownership
Based on the standard ownership classification system, the shares of listed firms in China are classified into the following categories: state, legal person, individual, foreign, employee, and management shares. Previous studies have used this classification scheme to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance (Sun and Tong, 2003) . However, given that legal person shares can be owned by a number of heterogeneous entities ranging from SOEs to private firms, this classification does not reveal the real identity of the ultimate owner, which could lead to erroneous conclusions (Berkman et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009) .
In this study, we investigate the ownership of listed firms in China based on the identity of the largest shareholder, that is, the ultimate owner, following the recent literature (La Porta et al., 1999; Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009 (Jin et al., 2005) . Second, the different incentives for government ownership lead to different levels of intervention in SOEs, with local governments tending to intervene more in firm operations than the central government.
Third, the literature documents that the operations and performance of central and local
SOEs are different Wang et al., 2008) .
Roles of the Chairman and CEO in the Operations of Chinese Listed Firms
In China, the top two executives of a company are the general manager and chairman of the board. The general manager is elected by and responsible for the board and, according to the literature, is essentially what is regarded in the United States as the CEO Yuan, 2008) . However, under Chinese corporate law, the chairman is the 5 China has five levels of government: (1) central, (2) provincial, (3) prefecture, (4) county, and (5) township. In our analysis, levels 2-5 are taken as local government.
legal representative of the company; therefore, this person is endowed with the highest level of authority in the firm and bears the overall responsibility for firm operations. In most cases, the chairman is also the highest paid employee. For these reasons, some studies regard the position of chairman, rather than that of general manager, as the top management post in a firm (e.g., Firth et al., 2006; Liao et al., 2009) .
In this study, we extend the research into CEO political connectedness to examine the political ties of both CEOs and chairmen.
Hypothesis Development
The Positive Effects of Political Connections according to Resource-based Theory
The resource-based theory of the firm can be used to explain the positive effects of political connections. According to this theory, a firm's competitive advantage is based on its possession of tangible and intangible resources that are difficult or costly for other firms to obtain. Previous studies have documented that politically connected managers can help their firms obtain key government resources and support (Adhikari et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008) . Hence, the positive impact of political connections is mainly driven by the advantage of obtaining key resources from the government.
Private firms are ultimately owned and controlled by nongovernment units. Their lacking political connections can put them in a disadvantageous position compared to SOEs, especially in transitional economies, which typically lack property rights protection and the market-supporting institutions needed by private firms (McMillan, 1995) . However, hiring politically connected managers is a feasible and effective way for private firms to overcome market-and state-level disadvantages and obtain favorable treatment from the government, which ultimately increases firm value (Li et al., 2008) .
However, the resource-based value of political connectedness is likely to be influenced by government ownership as resources are controlled by the government. SOEs have direct ties with the government, and thus have preferential status in obtaining bank loans and other key resources (Brandt and Li, 2003) . In addition, the government ownership link is more explicit and stable than a personal link with the government through a politically connected manager. Thus, it is unnecessary for SOEs to hire connected managers to obtain favorable treatment from the government. In other words, government ownership dilutes the effect of the political connectedness of managers, which mitigates the positive influence of such connectedness on firm value and performance.
The Negative Effects of Political Connections according to Agency Theory
Government ownership not only decreases the resource-based value of connected managers but may also result in a negative association between these managers and firm value and performance. This is particularly true among local SOEs, as they are ultimately controlled by local governments, which have both the power and incentives to intervene in firm operations to achieve social and political objectives. One incentive is decentralization (Jin et al., 2005) , and another is associated with the political aspirations, or career concerns, of local officials, as their promotion prospects largely depend on regional GDP, regional deficit numbers, and regional unemployment rates during their tenure (Li and Zhou, 2005) .
Given the strong incentives to intervene in the operations of local SOEs, local governments usually appoint managers to fulfill their goals. These politically connected managers then help local governments make use of the firms to fulfill political and social objectives, such as reducing unemployment. As they are appointed by the government, connected managers are more concerned about government goals than firm value. In summary, local SOEs with connected managers carry a great policy burden, which usually has a negative effect on firm value and performance.
In contrast, central SOEs with connected managers do not carry a great policy burden.
The aim of the central government in owning firms is to maintain control over key industries and thus guarantee the safety of the national economy (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of China, 2006) , whereas that of local governments is to increase GDP and reduce unemployment (Jin et al., 2005) . In addition, the incentive to use SOEs to implement political objectives is weaker for the central government than for local governments, because the interjurisdictional competition between local governments and contest for promotion among local officials are absent.
Consequently, the central government imposes a relatively lighter policy burden on central SOEs or the politically connected managers of these firms.
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As private firms are not subject to policy burdens, it is difficult for the government to intervene in their operations. In addition, the politically connected managers who are hired by the firms themselves are unlikely to be concerned about the government's social and political objectives. Based on the foregoing analysis, politically connected managers in private firms are expected to exert a positive impact on firm value as they bring in resource-based government benefits. The influence of connected managers of local SOEs on firm value and performance is expected be negative because local SOEs are required to pursue government objectives, which politically connected managers are obligated to fulfill. In central SOEs, the resource-based benefits of politically connected managers are mitigated by government ownership; however, these firms bear a lighter policy burden compared to local SOEs. Hence, we expect that among central SOEs, connected managers will have no effect on either firm value or performance.
Hypotheses
Our predictions are presented in hypothesis form as follows.
Hypothesis 1: Private firms with politically connected managers will have a higher value than those without connected managers.
Hypothesis 2: Local SOEs with politically connected managers will have a lower value than those without connected managers.
Hypothesis 3: Private firms with politically connected managers will obtain more favorable treatment from the government than those without connected managers.
Hypothesis 4: Local SOEs with politically connected managers will bear a greater policy burden than those without connected managers.
Research Design
Data
We manually collect politically related information on the CEOs and chairmen of the boards of all listed A-share companies in China from 1999 to 2006 from IPO prospectuses and annual reports. We trace political connections by examining whether the CEO or chairman is currently or was formerly an officer of the government or military.
Our financial data are taken from the China Stock Market and Accounting (CSMAR) database, which we also use to identify the ultimate owner for post-2003 observations. 7 We manually collect data on the identity of the ultimate owner from the annual reports and company Web sites for the pre-2003 period. Market development is determined using an index constructed with National Economic Research Institute (NERI) data from Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2007) .
Our original sample includes 1,408 firms and 9,629 firm-year observations from 1999
to 2006 for nonfinancial A-share listed firms in China. We delete firm-year observations with missing data or those for which total assets, sales, or equities are either zero or negative. We also delete any observations in which the ultimate owner is a foreign firm. 
Measurement of the Key Variables
(1) Measure of political connectedness (POLCON) Following Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) , we define a CEO as politically connected if he or she is currently serving or formerly served in the government or military. However, we extend their exploration of the political connectedness of CEOs to include chairmen, as both are important in China. POLCON is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a politically connected CEO and/or chairman, and zero otherwise. To investigate which of the two drives the effect of political connections on firm value and performance, we define two more dummy variables, POLCHAIR and POLCEO, which equal one if the firm has a politically connected chairman or CEO, respectively, and zero otherwise.
(2) Measures of firm value and performance
Following the literature, we use Tobin's Q to determine firm market value and return on assets (ROA) to measure firm performance. Tobin's Q is defined as the market value of total assets deflated by the book value of total assets, and is calculated as the ratio of the number of shares multiplied by the market price plus the book value of total debts to the book value of total assets. As a robustness test, we also set the market price of nontradable shares as the book value. ROA is defined as operating income divided by total assets.
In the regression models, we use industry-adjusted measures of value (ITOBINQ) and performance (IROA). ITOBINQ is calculated as a firm's Tobin's Q minus the median value for the industry after excluding politically connected firms, and IROA is calculated as the ROA minus the median value for the industry after excluding politically connected firms.
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The industry classification is based on that of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The sample is divided into 21 industries with nonmanufacturing industries given a one-digit code and manufacturing industries a two-digit code. We use industry-adjusted government subsidization (SUBSIDY) as a proxy for favorable treatment from the government. SUBSIDY is calculated as the subsidy revenue ratio minus the median value for the industry, where the total amount in subsidies received from the government is deflated by firm revenue.
(4) Measure of policy burden (BURDEN)
Following previous studies (Bai et al., 2006; Liao et al., 2009) , we use surplus labor as a proxy for policy burden and measure surplus labor using the following formula.
Sales
BURDEN Employ IndEmp Employ IndSales
where BURDEN is the percentage of surplus labor, Employ is the number of employees,
Sales is the total revenue, IndEmp is the industry average number of employees, and
IndSales is the industry average revenue. This estimate is a relative measure of the extent of surplus labor.
The Regression Model and Control Variables
We calculate the regression models using the following general form.
Dependent variables = α + β 1 POLCON + β 2 SIZE + β 3 LEV + β 4 CAPEX + β 5 BETA + β 6 TOP1 + β 7 TOP1*TOP1 + β 8 MINDEX + Industry and Year dummies + ε.
Regression model (1) is employed for the three subsamples based on ownership type. The dependent variables include the industry-adjusted value and performance measures, government subsidization, and policy burden. The definitions of the control variables are discussed in the following and summarized in Table 1 .
In the full sample regression, we estimate the equation using private firms as the reference group, and define two dummies, CENTRAL and LOCAL, to control for the influence of ownership type on firm value and performance. CENTRAL equals one if the firm is ultimately owned by the central government, and zero otherwise, and LOCAL equals one if the firm is ultimately owned by a local government, and zero otherwise. We conjecture that the interaction term between POLCON and LOCAL is negative in the regressions with ITOBINQ, IROA, and SUBSIDY as the dependent variables, and positive in the regression with BURDEN as the dependent variable.
We also include financial variables calculated at the beginning of the year to address endogeneity problems. SIZE, which is the natural log of total assets at the beginning of the year, is used to control for economies of scale or the size effect. Chen et al. (2009) find a positive association between firm size and performance. We conjecture that firm size is negatively associated with government subsidization and policy burden based on the economies of scale argument.
LEV is the financial leverage of a firm in the previous year, measured as the ratio of total debts to total assets. The free cash flow hypothesis argues that leverage mitigates agency problems and thus increases market valuation. This holds among private firms.
However, the positive relation between leverage and firm value may not hold among SOEs.
As SOEs usually borrow from state-owned banks, debtor monitoring efficiency is compromised. In addition, a higher degree of leverage usually means a greater probability of financial distress. SOEs with higher leverage will receive greater government subsidization because the government won't let them go bankrupt, which could lead to higher unemployment rates. Thus, SOEs with higher leverage will bear a lighter policy burden.
We also include CAPEX (capital expenditure/sales) in our model. CAPEX is a proxy for future investment opportunities. Chen et al. (2009) show that future investment opportunities are negatively related with valuation and positively related with performance.
The government encourages capital expenditure, which increases the level of employment.
Hence, firms with higher CAPEX values receive greater government subsidization and bear a greater policy burden compared to those with lower CAPEX values.
BETA (market risk) is estimated based on the market model, where the firm's monthly returns over the past five years are regressed on the value-weighted average market monthly returns. The larger is the BETA value, the higher is the level of stock returns and lower is the market valuation. We predict that BETA is negatively associated with both valuation and performance. However, market risk is expected to have no impact on either government subsidization or policy burden.
The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder (TOP1) and its squared term are included to capture the influence of the largest shareholder on firm value and performance. 10 The influence of TOP1 on government subsidization and policy burden is unclear. On the one hand, firms in which the government has a greater stake may receive more government subsidies and bear a lighter policy burden compared to those in which the government has a smaller stake. On the other hand, a greater stake provides incentives 10 Bai et al. (2004) suggest that there is a nonlinear relationship between TOP1 and market valuation.
for increased government intervention, which can result in a greater policy burden and lower level of subsidization. Therefore, the impact of TOP1 on government subsidization and policy burden will depend on the tradeoff between these two forces.
There are significant differences in regional development in China. To control for regional differences in the institutional environment (Jin et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009) , our model includes MINDEX, a marketization index that captures institutional progress
and measures the quality of market development at the provincial level. A higher MINDEX value indicates a more developed institutional environment. In a well-developed institutional environment, the government is restrained from intervening in firm operations;
hence, we expect that MINDEX will be positively associated with firm value and performance but negatively associated with government subsidization and policy burden.
Industry and year dummy variables are also included in the model.
Regression Method
We derive our main results using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. It has been argued that corporate governance may influence performance and vice versa (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . Hence, following Villalonga and Amit (2006), we employ the Heckman two-step treatment effects procedure to correct for endogeneity. The treatment effects model can correct for omitted variable bias (Green, 2003) , which cannot be solved using the two-stage-least-squares method with instrument variables.
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The first stage of the procedure involves a probit analysis in which the firm governance indicator dummies (for political connectedness) are regressed against the same controls used for the OLS regressions and panel analyses, plus four other variables known 11 We use the treatreg subroutine of the Stata package (version 8.2) to implement the treatment effects model.
to distinguish whether a firm has political connections or not. These variables are idiosyncratic risk (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 2007; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) , sales growth (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) , firm age (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) , and the lagged Tobin's Q (or other dependent variables in the second stage; Miller et al., 2007) .
Idiosyncratic risk is measured as the standard error estimation from the market model, where the firm's monthly returns over the past five years are regressed on the market value-weighted average monthly returns. Sales growth is calculated as the average sales growth rate over the previous three years. Firm age is measured as the natural log of the number of years since establishment. The lagged Tobin's Q (or other dependent variables in the second stage) is added to the probit model to test for potential reverse causation between firm value (or other dependent variables in the second stage) and political connectedness.
The estimated probability of political connectedness, which is called the treatment effect measure, is generated in the first stage. This instrument is then included in the second-stage regression, in which the dependent variable is the value (or performance, government subsidization and policy burden) measure. The independent variables in the second stage are similar to those used in the OLS regressions, except that POLCON is replaced by the treatment effect instrument to correct for omitted variable bias (Greene, 2003) . As almost all connected managers who previously held government positions served in a local government, we do not report the statistics by the period they served in the government or by the type of government for the three subsamples. three industries with the highest percentage of political connections are transportation (65.9%), power, gas, and water (62.9%), and mining (60.6%). These industries are all heavily controlled by the government. The three industries with the lowest percentage of political connections are timber and furniture (20.0%), architecture (23.9%), and machinery, equipment, and instruments (24.7%). We also perform all of our analyses without winsorizing the variables, and the results are similar.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
lower market value and poorer performance and a higher level of capital expenditure, and are located in more developed regions. Among private firms, those with political connections have a higher market value, lighter policy burden, and a lower level of capital expenditure, and are located in less developed regions. Central SOEs with political connections have a higher level of capital expenditure, higher level of market risk, and lower level of shareholding of the largest shareholder.
- Table 3 about here
We report the results of a correlation analysis of the variables in Table 4 . Except for POLCON, POLCHAIR, and POLCEO, the correlations among the variables are not strong.
In addition, we check the variance inflation factor (VIF) of the variables. Except for TOP1
and TOP1*TOP1, the VIF values of the variables in the regressions are less than 10, which indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem. When we rerun the regressions excluding TOP1 and TOP1*TOP1, the results are the same. Table 4 about here Overall, these results support our first and second hypotheses.
The Effect of Politically Connected Managers on Firm Value and Performance
Regarding the industry-adjusted ROA measure, the coefficient of POLCON for local SOEs is significantly negative, whereas that for private firms and for central SOEs is insignificant. This suggests that politically connected managers in local SOEs exert a negative effect on firm performance, whereas those in private firms and central SOEs have no impact. 15 In Model (8) of Table 5 , the significantly negative interaction term between POLCON and LOCAL indicates that the effect of politically connected managers in local SOEs on firm performance is weaker than that of connected managers in private firms.
Regarding the control variables used in Models (4) and (8) of Table 5 , the effect of 14 The observations are not independent and the errors are potentially serially correlated, which leads to inflated t-statistics. To overcome this problem, we cluster observations by firm and compute cluster-robust standard errors.
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Among private firms, the effect of politically connected managers on firm value is positive whereas that on firm performance is insignificant. This is reasonable because, as Faccio (2006) points out, there are costs associated with political connections, and these costs may harm performance.
CENTRAL is significantly positive whereas that of LOCAL is negative but insignificant.
This provides evidence that ownership type exerts a direct influence on firm value. Central SOEs have a higher value than private firms, but the coefficients of CENTRAL and LOCAL in Model (8) although positive are not significant. This indicates that there is no difference in accounting performance between SOEs and private firms after controlling for political connections. The coefficients of SIZE are all significantly negative in Models (1) through (4) and significantly positive in Models (5), (7), and (8), which suggests that firm size has a negative effect on value and a positive effect on performance. These results are consistent with those of Chen et al. (2009) .
LEV has a positive effect on market value among private firms and an insignificantly negative effect among local and central SOEs. The positive impact of leverage on valuation suggests that leverage mitigates the free cash flow problem in private firms. However, as SOEs have the advantage in borrowing from state-owned banks (Brandt and Li, 2003) , debtor monitoring efficiency could be compromised. Thus, among SOEs, greater leverage could lead to higher valuation but could exert a negative influence on operations. We find that LEV is negatively associated with performance in all three ownership subsamples.
CAPEX has a significantly negative effect on value among local SOEs and an insignificant negative effect on value among private firms and central SOEs, which suggests that the level of investment efficiency of local SOEs is lower than that of either private firms or central SOEs. However, CAPEX is positively related to short-term performance among both local SOEs and private firms.
The BETA coefficients for both local and central SOEs are significantly negative, while those on value and performance among private firms is negative but insignificant.
Among central and local SOEs, the coefficients of TOP1 are negative whereas those of the squared term of TOP1 are positive. This provides evidence of a nonlinear relationship between ultimate ownership and firm value and performance. However, such a pattern is not observed among private firms. The coefficients of MINDEX are positive and significant in Models (1) through (4) and Models (5), (6), and (8), which indicates that firms located in well-developed regions have a higher value and better performance. Table 6 reports the results of multivariate regression analysis to determine the relationship between connected managers and government subsidization and policy burden. Models (1) through (4) report the results for government subsidization and Models (5) through (8) report the results for policy burden. Models (1)-(4) show that the coefficient of POLCON is significantly positive for private firms but insignificant for both local and central SOEs, which suggests that private firms with politically connected managers are able to obtain more government subsidies than those without connected managers.
-------------------------------Insert Table 5 about here -------------------------------
The Effects of Government Subsidization and Policy Burden
However, this pattern is not observed among SOEs. Hence, our third hypothesis holds. Table 6 show that the coefficient of POLCON is positive and significant for local SOEs, which indicates that local SOEs with politically connected managers shoulder a greater policy burden than those without connected managers. The coefficients of POLCON for private firms and central SOEs are not significant. These results support our fourth hypothesis.
Models (5)-(8) of
In Model (4) of Table 6 , the coefficient of LOCAL is significantly positive, which indicates that local SOEs obtain more subsidies than either private firms or central SOEs.
Model (1) shows that local SOEs that are smaller in size, have higher levels of leverage and capital expenditure, or are located in less developed regions receive more subsidies. This indicates that local governments use subsidies to help SOEs that are located in less developed regions and in financial distress, to improve local employment levels.
Model (2) of Table 6 shows that private firms with a higher CAPEX value receive more subsidies; however, other control variables have no significant influence. This suggests that the government uses subsidies to encourage firms to invest in order to enhance employment. In addition, central SOEs with higher levels of leverage and capital expenditure obtain more subsidies, and the coefficient of squared TOP1 is significant, which suggests that the state ownership of central SOEs has a nonlinear impact on subsidization.
The coefficient of CENTRAL in Model (8) of Table 6 is significantly negative, which suggests that central SOEs have a lighter policy burden. In the three subsamples, the coefficients of SIZE and MINDEX are all significantly negative, whereas those of CAPEX are all significantly positive. These findings indicate that firms that are smaller in size, have a higher level of capital expenditure, and are located in less developed regions will have a lower level of policy burden. Larger firms usually have strong bargaining power with the government. Firms that have attracted a high level of investment create more jobs, so they receive more subsidies from the government. The government intervenes less in regions with higher levels of marketization; hence, the firms in those regions have lower levels of policy burden.
The other control variables have no significant influence on policy burden among local SOEs. However, the leverage ratio and stake of the largest shareholder have a significant impact among private firms and central SOEs. The coefficients of LEV are negative for both private firms and central SOEs, which suggests that firms with higher degrees of leverage have lower levels of policy burden because of the greater probability among them of financial distress. Among private firms and central SOEs, TOP1 has a nonlinear association with policy burden, and its coefficient is negative among private firms and positive among central SOEs. Table 7 presents 12 treatment effects models generated using the Heckman two-step method. For each subsample (local SOEs, central SOEs, and private firms), we create four models in which the dependent variables in the second stage are ITOBINQ, IROA, SUBSIDY, and BURDEN, respectively. For each model, we report only the selection parameter (lambda), which reflects the omitted variable bias and endogeneity problem; the coefficient of treatment effect (POLCON), which represents the coefficient corrected for endogeneity; and the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in the probit model to check for the presence of reverse causality. Except for the model for private firms in which the dependent variable is IROA, the lambda values of the models are all significant. This suggests that there is some endogeneity and omitted variable bias in the original OLS analyses. The lagged dependent coefficients in the probit model also provide evidence of endogeneity in the form of reverse causality between political connectedness and firm value (and performance). However, the significance of the adjusted POLCON coefficient (treatment effect) becomes stronger than that in the original analyses (shown in Tables 5 and 6), and thus our hypotheses hold. The treatment effect coefficients in Table 7 show that politically connected local SOEs have a lower market value, poorer performance, and a greater policy burden than unconnected ones; politically connected private firms have a higher market value and better performance, obtain more government subsidies, and have a lighter policy burden than unconnected ones; and politically connected central SOEs have a lower value and greater policy burden than unconnected ones.
-------------------------------Insert Table 6 about here -------------------------------
Treatment Effect Analyses for Endogeneity and the Reverse Causality Problem
-------------------------------Insert Table 7 about here -------------------------------
Politically Connected CEOs versus Politically Connected Chairmen
In this section, we separate politically connected managers into chairmen and CEOs to analyze which of the two drives the effect of political connections on firm value and performance. We replace POLCON with two dummy variables, POLCHAIR and POLCEO, which indicate whether a firm has a politically connected chairman or connected CEO, respectively. We then conduct similar regressions using the aforementioned procedure. Table 8 reports the results of the regression models with POLCHAIR and POLCEO.
For brevity, we present only the coefficients of POLCHAIR, POLCEO, and their interaction terms with the ownership dummies. The untabulated results for the other control variables are similar to those presented in Tables 5 and 6 . Panels A, B, and C of Table 8 report the results for local SOEs, private firms, and central SOEs, respectively, and Panel D reports the results for the full sample. POLCHAIR and POLCEO are included separately in the regression models for each dependent variable. 16 As shown in Panel A of Table 8 , the coefficients of both POLCHAIR and POLCEO are insignificant in Models (1), (2), (5), and (6), which indicates that neither politically connected chairmen nor connected CEOs have a distinct effect on firm value or policy burden in local SOEs. In Models (3) and (4), POLCEO is negatively associated with the performance of local SOEs, but POLCHAIR is not. In Models (7) and (8), both the POLCHAIR and POLCEO coefficients are significantly positive; however, the magnitudes of the latter are greater than those of the former. These findings provide evidence that politically connected CEOs may play a more important role in the operations of local SOEs than politically connected chairmen, perhaps because the government usually appoints politically connected CEOs to implement its policies. Table 8 reports the results for private firms. The coefficients of POLCHAIR and POLCEO are insignificant except for that of POLCHAIR in Model (5), which is significantly positive. An explanation for the greater influence of politically connected chairmen compared to connected CEOs in obtaining government subsidies is that in private firms, the former usually hold substantial equity in the firm, which gives them greater incentive to secure government subsidies compared to CEOs.
Panel B of
As shown in Panel C of Table 8 , all coefficients of POLCHAIR and POLCEO in the eight models are insignificant, which indicates that both politically connected chairmen and connected CEOs in central SOEs affect firm value and performance, government 16 We also include POLCHAIR and POLCEO together in one model, and the results are similar. subsidization, and policy burden levels. Panel D of Table 8 shows similar results: among the eight models, the coefficients of POLCHAIR and POLCEO are insignificant except for that of POLCHAIR in Model (5). The interaction terms between POLCHAIR or POLCEO and CENTRAL or LOCAL are also insignificant.
In summary, the results in Table 8 show that neither politically connected chairmen nor connected CEOs alone drive the effect of politically connected managers on firm value and performance. This indicates that both chairmen and CEOs have an important impact on operations and that neither is more important than the other in determining firm value and performance. The effect of politically connected managers among local SOEs controlled by parent
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Additional Tests
SOEs is similar to that of the full local SOE sample, whereas the effect becomes insignificant among local SOEs controlled by state bureaus. This suggests that among listed SOEs controlled by parent SOEs, the government exerts a greater influence on firms with politically connected managers than on those without. However, among SOEs controlled by state bureaus, the political connectedness of managers does not affect government influence.
(2) Alternative measures of value and performance
In addition to the standard Tobin's Q, we consider the special split share structure in China, where some shares are nontradable in the stock market. We set the market value of nontradable shares as their book value, because these shares are usually transferred at a price that is benchmarked against the book value. Thus, Tobin's Q is calculated as the ratio of the number of tradable shares multiplied by the market price plus the number of 17 We repeat the test using the central SOEs controlled by SOEs, which includes 1,408 observations after excluding the 66 observations for SOEs controlled by state bureaus. The results are similar to those for the full central SOE sample. As SOEs controlled by state bureaus represent less than 5% of the full central SOE sample, we do not report the results using the subsamples.
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The percentages of connected chairmen of local SOEs controlled by state bureaus and those by SOEs are 30.1% and 30.8%, while the percentages of connected CEOs of the two groups are 17.4% and 13.1%, respectively. nontradable shares multiplied by the book value of equity per share plus the book value of total debts to the book value of total assets. We also use return on equity (ROE) as an alternative proxy for accounting performance, measured as the ratio of net income to the book value of equity. Using the new industry-adjusted Tobin's Q and industry-adjusted ROE as the dependent variables, we re-estimate the regression models, and the results are similar to those reported in Table 5 .
(3) Replacing MINDEX with regional dummies
Instead of using MINDEX to capture regional differences, we use regional dummies in the regression. Based on the level of economic development, we divide the country into three regions: eastern, middle, and western. The eastern region has the highest level of economic development, whereas the western region has the lowest level. 19 We generate two dummies: EAST and WEST. EAST equals one if the firm is located in the eastern region, and zero otherwise. WEST is coded as one if the firm is located in the western region. We re-estimate the regression models, and our results are the same.
Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the influence of ownership on the relationship between political connectedness and firm value and performance. More specifically, we study the difference in the role played by politically connected managers in determining firm value and performance between SOEs and private firms. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms 19 The eastern region includes the eleven provinces of Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. The middle region is composed of eight provinces: Anhui, Hei Longjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, and Shanxi. The western region consists of twelve provinces, namely, Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Xizang, and Yunnan.
covering the 1999-2006 period, we find that private firms with politically connected managers have a higher value than those without connected managers, whereas local SOEs with connected managers have a lower value and underperform those lacking connected managers. Among central SOEs, political connections have no impact on firm performance.
We also identify the channels through which the politically connected managers of private firms and local SOEs exert an influence on firm value and performance. We find that connected managers in private firms secure more government subsidies, whereas those in local SOEs are associated with a greater policy burden in the form of surplus labor.
Our analysis reveals that the effect of political connectedness is subject to ownership.
Our results help to explain the mixed findings of previous research of both positive and negative effects of political ties on firm value and performance. Our study also identifies government subsidization and surplus labor as two channels through which politically connected managers influence firm value and performance. Additionally, contributing to the debate about whether the chairman or the CEO should be regarded as representing the top executive in Chinese firms, we find that neither the chairman nor the CEO alone drives the effect of politically connected managers, which suggests that they play equally important roles in managing listed Chinese firms.
This study also provides policy implications for other countries with SOEs. Our results indicate that politically connected managers in local SOEs tend to assist the government to use these firms to pursue political and social agendas, whereas their counterparts in central SOEs don't hurt the firm performance. It implies that central government should impose different policies on local and central SOEs to improve their performance and optimize the resource allocation. It is essential to avoid assigning politically connected managers to local SOEs. Estimated from the market model where the firm's monthly returns over the past five years are regressed on the value-weighted average market monthly returns.
TOP1
The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder MINDEX An index, constructed by Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2007) , that measures the market development of the region in which a firm is located, where a higher index value indicates a more developed market environment. We use this index to control for regional differences. Table 1 . The constant term, industry dummies, and year dummies are included in the regression but not reported. The p-values, which are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, are presented in parentheses below the estimates, where *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 6 OLS Regression of the Impact of Political Connections on Government Subsidization and
Policy Burden
This table reports the regression results on the association between the political connections dummy and government subsidization and policy burden. The definitions of the variables are as presented in Table 1 . The constant term, industry dummies, and year dummies are included in the regression but not reported. The p-values, which are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, are presented in parentheses below the estimates, where *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 7 Heckman Treatment Effects Analyses
This table reports the results of the Heckman two-step treatment effects model. The definitions of the variables are as presented in Table 1 . The p-values, which are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, are presented in parentheses below the estimates, where *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 1 . Except for POLCHAIR and POLCEO replacing POLCON, the independent variables are the same as those in Tables 5 and 6 . To save space, we report only the results for POLCHAIR, POLCEO, and their interaction terms with the ownership dummies. The p-values, which are adjusted for clustering at the firm level, are presented in parentheses below the estimates, where *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
